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Assistant Professor
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Attacks on Amazon, Google, and Facebook have tended
to ignore a key lesson of the theory of monopolistic
competition: that big is not always bad. A monopolist
grows large because consumers prefer the firm’s products.
The only question for the antitrust laws is whether consumers prefer the monopolist’s products because the monopolist has improved its products relative to those of
competitors, or because the monopolist has degraded
the products of competitors without improving its own.
Only product-degrading conduct is socially harmful
and violative of the antitrust laws. Although a complete
accounting of conduct by Amazon, Google or Facebook
is not yet available, examples of conduct highlighted by
the press of late build a case against Facebook alone.
Amazon’s biased promotion of its own products over
those of third-party sellers makes Amazon better, by
helping consumers avoid fakes sold by third parties on
Amazon’s website. Google’s use of information gleaned
from its publishing platform to offer the best prices for
ad placement via the company’s advertising exchange
improves Google’s advertising exchange. But Facebook’s
termination of competing apps’ access to friend lists
does appear to have degraded the quality of competing
apps without improving Facebook’s own social media
products, suggesting both harm to society and the possibility of antitrust liability.

I. Introduction
1. Calls for breakup of three digital giants, Google,
Facebook, and Amazon, have proliferated in the press in
the United States over the past two years.1 Critics argue

1 See, e.g., R. Brandom, The monopoly-busting case against Google, Amazon, Uber, and
Facebook: What tech companies have to fear from antitrust law, The Verge, Sept. 5,
2018, https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/5/17805162/monopoly-antitrust-regulationgoogle-amazon-uber-facebook; C. Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N. Y.
Times (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chrishughes-facebook-zuckerberg.html; J. Taplin, Is It Time to Break Up Google?, N. Y.
Times (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/isit-time-to-break-up-google.html; A. Young, Is it time to break up Amazon.com?
Here’s how it gets done, Salon (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.salon.com/2018/08/13/
how-would-you-break-up-amazon-com-if-it-ever-came-to-that.

that Amazon operates its website in ways that disadvantage third-parties that sell products via the website.2
They argue that Google uses its near-total control over
software for advertising publishers to destroy competitors in the market to broker sales of advertising space.3
And they argue that Facebook cut off access to its friend
lists to nascent competitors in order to maintain the
social networking giant’s large share of the social media
market.4 Although a complete accounting of conduct
by Google, Facebook, or Amazon has not yet emerged,
these examples of conduct build a case against Facebook
alone, at least so far as the antitrust laws of the United
States are concerned.

II. The nature
of monopolization
2. The question whether Amazon, Google, or Facebook
have broken the antitrust laws is badly complicated by a
lack in the scholarly literature of a coherent account of
how individual firms wield power, and when the wielding
of power should violate the antitrust laws.5
3. The starting point for any such account must be the
rule that big is never bad in itself. This pillar of the antitrust laws is often expressed more blandly as the “conduct
requirement,” the rule that proof of anticompetitive

2 See J. Greene,Amazon Sellers Say Online Retail Giant isTrying to Help Itself, Not Consumers,
Wash. Post (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/01/
amazon-sellers-say-online-retail-giant-is-trying-help-itself-not-consumers.
3 See K. Hagey and V. Ngo, How Google Edged Out Rivals and Built the World’s Dominant
Ad Machine: A Visual Guide, Wall St. J. (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
how-google-edged-out-rivals-and-built-the-worlds-dominant-ad-machine-a-visualguide-11573142071.
4 See A. Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg personally approved cutting off Vine’s friend-finding
feature, The Verge (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/5/18127202/
mark-zuckerberg-facebook-vine-friends-api-block-parliament-documents.
5 For the standard account, see H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of
Competition and Its Practice 353–454 (5th ed., West Academic Publishing, 2016).
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5. The current legal test for monopoly power incorporates
the insight that monopoly is a matter of degree. The test
requires proof of the power, not just profitably to raise
prices, but profitably to raise prices by a substantial amount,
above costs.16 Thus the power of a seller in a market saturated with different, but still highly similar, products will
not count as monopoly power under the law, even though
the enduring uniqueness of the seller’s product will still
give the seller the power profitably to raise prices.17 The
presence of similar products in the market will prevent the
firm from raising prices substantially above costs.18 As an
economic matter, power over price exists even in competitive markets, but competition limits that power. The
substantiality requirement determines when competition
is strong enough to allow a firm’s power to be ignored.19

1. Lessons of the theory
of monopolistic competition

2. Good monopolies

4. It turns out that the conduct requirement does not represent the co-optation of a well-intentioned law by corporate
special interests. Instead, the conduct requirement reflects
intellectual insights regarding the functioning of real world
markets contributed by a British left-wing radical and an
American scholar so progressive in outlook that he wanted
to ban commercial branding.10 Joan Robinson and Edward
Chamberlin were the first to build an economic theory
around the observation that all products in all markets are
differentiated, even if only by time and place of sale.11 They
recognized that a consequence of that product differentiation is that sellers always have some amount of monopoly
power, because there will always be some consumers
who prefer any particular seller’s products over others’
and are willing to pay at least a slightly higher price for
access to them.12 It follows that every firm meets the
basic economic test for possession of monopoly power,
namely, that the firm have the power profitably to raise
price above cost, and every firm is therefore a monopolist
of its own product, no matter how competitive markets
may be.13 The implication of this theory of monopolistic competition is that antitrust must tolerate a certain
level of monopoly power always and everywhere.14
The question is not whether any given firm is a monopoly,
but whether any given firm is too much of a monopoly.15

6 See ibid. at 360–62.
7 See R. A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. Miami L. Rev. 105, 116–120
(2013).
8 See ibid. at 109–116.
9 See ibid.
10 See E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-Orientation of the
Theory of Value 233–234 (7th ed., Harvard University Press, 1956); N. Aslanbeigui &
G. Oakes, The Provocative Joan Robinson: The Making of a Cambridge Economist 3 (Duke
University Press Books, 2009).
11 See S. Brakman & B. J. Heijdra, Introduction, in The Monopolistic Competition Revolution
in Retrospect 1, 7–8 (S. Brakman & B. J. Heijdra eds., Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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6. The theory of monopolistic competition creates a foundation for the conduct requirement, because the theory
implies that monopolies can be good or bad, depending on how they behave. The theory predicts that firms
that produce products that consumers prefer will tend
to become large, and indeed acquire monopoly power,
because consumers will flock to those firms’ products
and be willing to pay more for them.20 Whether consumers’ preference for a monopolist’s products is good or bad
depends upon whether the monopolist created that preference by improving the monopolist’s own products or
by degrading those of competitors. Product-improving
conduct is always good for society as a whole—it expands
the technological capabilities of the economy—and can be
good for all parts of society, from workers to consumers,
so long as taxation or price regulation distributes the gains
broadly. Product-degrading conduct is bad for society,
because it effectively reduces the technical capacity of
the economy. While product-degrading conduct enriches
the monopolist, the conduct can do so only by effectively redistributing wealth from other groups to the firm,
because the conduct creates no overall economic gains.
The big firm might be big because it is loved, providing
products that consumers prefer, or because the firm has
suppressed the better products offered by competitors,
leaving consumers without better options.21
7. The theory of monopolistic competition therefore
teaches that antitrust must not simply smash even the
most powerful monopolies whenever they appear, any
more than a democratic system should smash any political candidate who wins a majority of the vote. Antitrust
must instead distinguish those firms that have grown and
persisted by doing good from those that have grown and
persisted by doing bad. Just so, a democratic system must

16 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 111–116.
17 See United States v. EI du Pont de Nemours at 392–393.

12 See Chamberlin, supra note 10, at 71.

18 See ibid.

13 See ibid. at 115.

19 See ibid.

14 See United States v. EI du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 392–393 (1956).

20 See Chamberlin, supra note 10, at 110–113.

15 See ibid.

21 See ibid.
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conduct is required for single-firm liability, while proof
of monopoly power alone is never sufficient.6 At first
glance this rule appears to be an abject betrayal of the
purpose of the antitrust laws, in so far as the rule permits
firms having the power to raise prices above competitive levels to persist indefinitely, so long as they abide
by certain rules of behavior.7 That might be reasonable
were the act of actually exercising power by raising prices
above costs to count as bad conduct in satisfaction of
the conduct requirement. But it does not.8 A monopoly
that rips consumers off, that charges prices so high that
some cannot afford to buy at all and others are impoverished, does not automatically violate the antitrust laws.9
How can this possibly be?

8. While product-improving conduct is always good for
the economy, the monopoly power to which it gives rise
can still harm particular groups. A monopolist may so
improve its products as to permit the firm to charge prices
above costs, even after accounting for costs of research
and development, and for the costs of providing investors with reasonable returns.24 Such excessive pricing in
effect limits the ability of consumers to share in the gains
created by the firm’s product-improving conduct. Similarly, a monopolist may use its power to suppress wages,
preventing workers from sharing in the gains from the
firm’s product-improving conduct.
9. Government must step in to ensure that the good
monopolist shares the wealth, but traditional antitrust
remedies, such as breakup of the monopolist, throw the
baby out with the bathwater. Breaking up a good monopolist that charges excessive prices would mean breaking
up a firm that has grown large by improving its products,
and that in turn risks stopping the process of improvement.25 Not having improvements is worse for consumers than having them at excessive prices, so breakup is
not an option.26 Apple might charge excessive prices for
the iPhone, but breaking up the company might lead to
poor-quality iPhones in future. To be sure, antitrust could
attack excessive pricing by injunction, commanding the
large firm to lower prices instead of breaking up the
firm, but that takes antitrust far enough away from its
core mission of promoting competition, and far enough
into the territory already occupied by public utility rate
regulatory regimes, as to require an Act of Congress to
proceed, and no act authorizing antitrust authorities
to undertake rate regulation has been forthcoming.27

10. Attacks on the digital giants have often included calls
to revise the consumer welfare standard.28 That standard
is responsible, in substance, for the distinction between
conduct that degrades the products of others and
conduct that improves the monopolist’s own product.
Doing away with the consumer welfare standard would
effectively prohibit size, exposing firms that win by
being better than the competition to as much liability as
firms that win by making competitors worse.
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punish those who win elections by stuffing ballots or
assassinating challengers, but not those who win by being
loved. Antitrust incorporates this insight by not prohibiting size per se, but only monopoly power attributable to
bad conduct.22 All of the forms of conduct that antitrust
recognizes as anticompetitive are methods of making a
firm’s products appeal to consumers by degrading the
quality of the products offered by other firms.23

11. That is not to say that nothing can or should be
done to temper the negative effects of size. Even the
firm that grows large by being better can inflict harm by
charging excessive prices.29 The proper approach is to
regulate the firm’s prices, something that rate regulators
in many industries have done effectively for more than a
century.30 If new laws should be passed in relation to the
tech giants, the laws should authorize regulation of their
prices. The antitrust laws already suffice to break monopolies up if they are bad.31

3. Antisocial is not always bad
12. The distinction between product-improving conduct
and product-degrading conduct is often difficult to grasp,
particularly for a press of antitrust neophytes concerned
about digital monopoly, because both product-improving and product-degrading conduct are based upon the
antisocial practice of refusing to share.32 It is obvious
enough that a firm can degrade competitors’ products,
without improving its own, only by depriving competitors of inputs they need but which the firm does not need
for its own products. But it is also equally true that a firm
can improve its own products, relative to others’, only
by refusing to improve competitors’ products instead, in
effect refusing to supply competitors with the inputs that
the firm uses to improve itself.33 Competition is fundamentally antisocial. But the goal of the antitrust laws is
to promote competition, which means that antitrust must
tolerate at least some kinds of antisocial behavior: the
kinds that improve products.

22 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966).
23 For a rough and imperfect attempt to demonstrate this proposition, see Woodcock, supra
note 7, at 136–154.
24 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 126–136.
25 See H. Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. L. & Econ. 1,
2 (1973). Occasionally, breakup may be possible. But even then, breakup is still no better
a method of preventing excessive pricing than is the alternative of direct price regulation
by injunction or administrative action.
26 So long as the source of a firm’s size is product-improving conduct, the firm cannot price
so excessively as to leave consumers worse off than they would be buying alternative
products, because then consumers would buy alternative products and the firm would
shrink. A product-improving monopoly can charge excessive prices in the sense of prices
above costs, but consumers will always remain better off paying those prices than they
would buying alternative, less-desirable, products at prevailing prices. Cf. Woodcock,
supra note 7, at 126–136.
27 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 393. For a way in which the antitrust laws might be
interpreted to authorize courts to condemn excessive prices, see R. A. Woodcock, The
Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. 1741, 1742–1750 (2018). For
a comparison of the approaches of competition regimes in the United States and the
European Union to the problem of excessive pricing, see T. Ackermann, Excessive Pricing
and the Goals of Competition Law, in The Goals of Competition Law 349, 351–357
(D. Zimmer ed., Edward Elgar, 2012).

28 See D. Streitfeld, To Take Down Big Tech, They First Need to Reinvent the Law, N. Y.
Times (Jun. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giantsantitrust-law.html.
29 See Woodcock, supra note 7, at 109–116.
30 See J. D. Kearney & T. W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,
98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1333–1340 (1998).
31 See J. B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 Antitrust L. J. 527, 586
(2012).
32 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 293–294.
33 See ibid.
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13. But even grasping the distinction between bad, product-degrading denials of inputs and good, product
improving, denials of inputs is not sufficient fully to
understand when monopolization liability should or does
exist. It is equally important to grasp the airtight connection required by the law between the market in which
the monopolist has monopoly power and the market to
which the monopolist denies inputs. A monopolist that
denies inputs to a firm operating in a market in which the
monopolist does not have monopoly power may inflict
harm on the firm, but that is not bad conduct under
the law, because the monopolist does not have power—
understood as the power profitably to raise price by a
substantial amount above costs—in that market.
14. To hold otherwise would force a monopolist to supply
inputs to markets in which the monopolist does not
operate, solely because firms in that market happen to
need the inputs to compete amongst themselves.34 But the
number of markets that might benefit from supply by
any particular monopolist is potentially infinite. There
may be thousands of retailers across the country, for
example, that would benefit greatly were Chanel to
supply products to them. A rule prohibiting input denial
whenever input denial would cause harm in any market
would require Chanel to supply to all of those retailers.
Indeed, to enforce such a rule, the courts would be put
in the position of judging every monopolist’s decisions
regarding which markets to enter and which not, a role
that would make the courts something like the board of
directors of every monopoly. But that role, like the role
of setting prices, is usually reserved for rate regulators.35
15. For lack of a better limiting principle, antitrust
chooses to reserve liability for input denial to denial
of inputs that feed markets in which the monopolist has power, and presumably has the most to gain
from harming competition and thereby perpetuating its
monopoly. Thus antitrust can only compel Chanel to
supply retailers in markets in which Chanel also has its
own retail stores and those Chanel stores have monopoly
power in those markets.

5. Monopoly power and power
over inputs distinguished
16. Denial of inputs cannot degrade competitors’
products if competitors can get inputs elsewhere, so
something like monopoly control over inputs is also
required for liability.36 But this requirement of power

34 This requirement is perhaps best captured by the element of the essential facilities doctrine
that requires that the facility be essential to rivals of the defendant. See ibid. at 412; MCI
Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F. 2d 1081, 1132–1133 (7th Cir. 1983).
35 See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Economics of Regulation and Antitrust 439–441 (5th ed., MIT
Press, 2018).
36 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 393.
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over inputs, often characterized as the requirement that
the input controlled by the monopolist be “essential,”
must not be confused with the requirement that the firm
have monopoly power in the downstream market fed by
the input.37 Power over inputs matters because a firm
that denies a competitor access to an input that competitors can easily get elsewhere cannot harm competition.
The focus of a monopolization case is, however, never on
condemning the fact that the monopolist has power over
the input, but only on condemning any use of that power
by the monopolist to maintain its monopoly position
in the downstream market through degradation of the
products of the monopolist’s competitors in that downstream market. This focus on the market downstream
from the input may explain why the formal requirement
of proof of monopoly power in any monopolization case
applies only to power in the downstream market, not
the input market. By contrast, courts establish the existence of power over the input informally, often inferring
it from the special nature of the input, as when the input
is a standard-essential patent.38 To challenge monopolization of the input market, rather than the downstream
market fed by the input, would require transferring the
entire analysis one level up the supply chain, by identifying the firm’s control over a second input, this time an
input into production of the first input, formal proof of
monopoly power in the market for the first input, denial
to competitors in that market of access to the second
input, and so on.

III.Three digital giants
1. Amazon
17. Attacks on Amazon, Google, or Facebook in the
press have tended to emphasize one element of monopolization, such as monopoly power or input denial, and
ignore the others, even though all elements are required
for liability. This is nowhere clearer than in attacks on
Amazon. Journalists condemning Amazon’s behavior
tend to focus on Amazon’s plenary power to control
its own website, operating as an input, or platform, for
the sale of goods.39 Critics argue that, in giving preferential treatment to its own products in Amazon search
results, Amazon in effect denies third-party sellers access
to unbiased promotion of their products on Amazon’s
website.40 Critics also argue that Amazon effectively
denies third-party sellers full use of Amazon’s website
by charging sellers thousands of dollars for access to
customer service when sellers have technical difficulties.41 But these critics fail to perceive that the antitrust
laws prohibit input denial, even product-degrading input

37 See ibid. at 412.
38 See Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, No. 17-CV-00220-LHK 5 (N.D.
Cal. May 21, 2019).
39 See Greene, supra note 2.
40 See Greene, supra note 2.
41 See ibid.
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4. The monopolist must abuse
its own markets

18. Amazon may well have the requisite power in some
product markets, but those markets are likely to be few
and far between. In recent years as much as 60% of the
products sold on Amazon have been sold by third-party
sellers, rather than by Amazon for its own account.43
If individual product markets reflect this average, then
Amazon’s share of every product market—40%—would
be far below the 70% threshold generally required by the
courts to entertain the possibility of monopoly power, at
least according to the popular method of indirect proof.44
Indeed, it is an irony of attacks on Amazon over the past
year that the same newspapers that promote antitrust
action against Amazon have also decried the proliferation of fake, dangerous, and low-quality products on the
site.45 Fakery and poor quality are hallmarks of excessively competitive markets, not monopolized markets,
because only in markets occupied by large numbers
of sellers can fly-by-night purveyors of fake and poor
quality products hide, both from regulators and disaffected consumers, behind a veil of anonymity.
19. Even if Amazon has a large market share in some
categories of products sold on Amazon, the company
may not have monopoly power, because many products
sold on Amazon compete with products sold via other
channels, both online and offline. Amazon has a 100%
share of the market for new iPhones sold on Amazon,
but it would be a mistake to infer that Amazon has
monopoly power in iPhone retail, because consumers can
buy iPhones from many other retailers, including Apple’s
own stores and Walmart, if they do not like Amazon’s
prices.46
20. Even if monopoly power can be established in a given
product market, there remains the question whether
Amazon’s input denials improve or degrade products.47
Amazon’s denial of customer service to third-party sellers
probably does degrade third-party sellers’ products,
by making it hard for third-party sellers to operate

42 See supra Section II.4.
43 See A. Berzon, S. Shifflett & J. Scheck, Amazon Has Ceded Control of Its Site. The Result:
Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, Wall St. J. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-has-ceded-control-of-its-site-the-result-thousands-ofbanned-unsafe-or-mislabeled-products-11566564990.
44 See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 357.
45 Compare C. Kang et al., Google and Amazon Are at the Center of a Storm Brewing Over
Big Tech, N. Y. Times (Jun. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/business/
google-antitrust-investigation.html; with D. Streitfeld, What Happens After Amazon’s
Domination Is Complete? Its Bookstore Offers Clues, N. Y. Times (Jun. 23, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/technology/amazon-domination-bookstore-books.html.

functioning online stores. But Amazon’s long history of
losses and razor-thin margins on its e-commerce platform
suggest that the higher prices Amazon now charges
for customer service are necessary for the company to
maintain profitability.48 Because a reasonable amount of
profitability is a prerequisite for a product to exist at all,
Amazon’s conduct is effectively product improving, and
therefore not a basis for antitrust liability.
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denial, only when the denier has monopoly power in the
downstream market fed by the input.42 Critics appear not
to have pointed to any evidence that Amazon has power
in the individual markets for the thousands of products
that appear for sale on Amazon’s website, even though
those are the downstream markets that are effectively fed
by the distribution input that is Amazon’s website.

21. The case against Amazon’s denial of access to
promotion is even more tenuous, particularly against the
backdrop of complaints about the proliferation of fake
and dangerous products sold on the company’s website.
The best way for Amazon to guarantee quality to customers is to sell products for its own account, thereby stepping
into the supply chain itself, and putting its own profits
more directly at risk if products purchased on its website
turn out to be shoddy. Most retailers take this approach,
and do not let any third-party sellers sell on their platforms at all.49 There are almost no third-party sellers in a
Home Depot, or a Walmart.50 Amazon’s policy of preferentially promoting its own products on its website takes
the company a step in this direction, by making sure that
shoppers on Amazon always know when they have the
option to buy from Amazon, rather than from potentially-untrustworthy third parties. This surely harms the
businesses of third-party sellers, even reputable ones, but
the conduct also improves Amazon’s products, if ease of
finding a trustworthy purchase option may be considered
a product attribute.51 Indeed, it is another irony of press
attacks on Amazon that the company has opened its
platform up to third-party competition more than almost
any other retailer and yet has been attacked more than
any other for monopolization.
22. The principal gripe of critics with Amazon seems ultimately not to be with the company’s monopolization of
any particular product market, but with the company’s
plenary power over a website through which roughly a
third of all online commerce flows.52 That is, the gripe
is with Amazon’s power in the retail platform market,
rather than the company’s power in individual consumer
product markets. But to make that case, critics must be
able to show that Amazon has used power over some
other input, an input into the creation of retail platforms themselves, to deny that input to competing retail
platforms, like Walmart, and indeed also that Amazon
has monopoly power in the retail platform market itself.
But Amazon’s 30% share of online retail is far below the
70% threshold required to show monopoly power by

48 See A. Griswold & J. Karaian, It took Amazon 14 years to make as much in net profit as it
did last quarter, Quartz (Feb. 1, 2018), https://qz.com/1196256/it-took-amazon-amzn14-years-to-make-as-much-net-profit-as-it-did-in-the-fourth-quarter-of-2017.
49 See Berzon, Shifflett & Scheck, supra note 43.
50 See ibid.

46 See N. Nix & J. Light, Amazon’s Deal to Sell New Apple Devices Under Scrutiny by FTC,
Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-02/
amazon-s-deal-to-sell-new-apple-devices-under-scrutiny-by-ftc.

51 Unlike most advertising, the promotion here is informative, amounting to an
improvement in Amazon’s product search algorithm that optimizes for product safety and
trustworthiness. See R. A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information
Age, 127 Yale L. J. 2270, 2299–2308, 2316 (2018).

47 See supra Section II.2.

52 See Greene, supra note 2.
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2. Google
23. Critics of Google have done a better job of alleging
denials of inputs in markets in which the firm is likely
to have monopoly power, but critics have been no
better at identifying input denials that degrade, rather
than improve, products.55 Google probably does have
monopoly power in the advertising exchange market.56
And Google has indeed denied competing advertising exchanges access to an essential input that Google
itself has in spades, namely, information about what
other advertising exchanges are bidding for the right to
place advertisements in a given online space.57 Google
owns DoubleClick for Publishers, a software platform
that virtually all advertising publishers use to access bids
for their spaces that have been placed through advertising exchanges.58 That gives Google access to bid information from competing advertising exchanges that
other exchanges lack, and therefore allows Google’s own
advertising exchange, AdX, an advantage in securing the
highest bid and winning the business.59
24. That sounds pretty evil, if you are a competing advertising exchange, but there is also no doubt that this
practice makes AdX a better product both for advertising publishers, who know they always get the market-best
price from AdX, and for advertisers, who know they can
always win the bidding if they place their advertisements
through AdX. Indeed, this sort of implacable competition from Google should have forced competing advertising exchanges always to secure the highest possible bids,
in the hope of securing bids that Google cannot match.
That is a competitive result.60 If competitors fail to rise
to the challenge, all other exchanges are driven from the

market, and Google now has the freedom to raise the fees
the company charges users of AdX, the solution is price
regulation of the advertising exchange market, not antitrust. Indeed, the success of AdX shows that the market
prefers an AdX monopoly, so long as regulators can keep
AdX’s fees at reasonable levels.

3. Facebook
25. The strongest case for liability is against Facebook,
for the company’s termination of competitors’ access to
friend lists.61 The lists are an essential input for new social
media apps, which access the lists, with user permission, to help new users build their networks on the
new apps. Facebook initially allowed outside apps
to access Facebook friend lists, because that allowed
Facebook to keep tabs on the popularity of its competitors. But Facebook later terminated access, apparently because of fears that competitors would become
too successful.62 That is denial of an essential input
that degrades the quality of competitors’ products—
making it hard for users to invite friends to join outside
apps—without improving the quality of Facebook’s own
product. Facebook also likely has monopoly power in
the social media market, defined as a market in which
the price charged is denominated in valuable user data,
rather than dollars, because social media services are
usually offered at a dollar price of zero.63 The fact that
Facebook reversed a prior policy of access to friend lists
makes its input denial a termination of a prior and, given
the benefits of being able to measure competitors’ popularity, profitable, course of dealing, in satisfaction of
prerequisites for liability for input denial suggested by the
Supreme Court in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko.64

IV. Conclusion
26. Only those digital giants that have grown by degrading competitors’ products are bad for society and should
be considered for breakup. The rest may be retained
without regret. n

53 For the collapse of brick-and-mortar retail, see J. Rieser & K. Domb Sadof, Photographing
the Retail Apocalypse, Wash. Post (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
photography/2019/11/22/photographing-retail-apocalypse; Greene, supra note 2.
54 See J. Del Rey, Amazon’s new weapon to crush competition: $1 items delivered for free —
by tomorrow, Vox (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/10/14/20906728/
amazon-prime-low-price-products-add-on-one-day-delivery.
55 See Hagey & Ngo, supra note 3.
56 See ibid.; D. Geradin & D. Katsifis, Google’s (Forgotten) Monopoly – Ad Technology
Services on the Open Web, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3391913 8, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3391913, June 10, 2019.

61 See C. Farivar, Bikini app maker draws another disgruntled developer to its Facebook
fight, Ars Technica (Dec. 7, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/12/
facebook-weaponized-user-data-app-developers-new-lawsuit-claims.

57 See Hagey & Ngo, supra note 3; Geradin & Katsifis, supra note 56, at 9–10.

62 See Robertson, supra note 4; Farivar, supra note 60.

58 See Geradin & Katsifis, supra note 64, at 6–7.
59 See Hagey & Ngo, supra note 3; Geradin & Katsifis, supra note 56, at 9–10.
60

58

Whether advertising itself is a social good is another story. See Woodcock, supra note
51, at 2278–2290.
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63 See E. Deutscher, How to Measure Privacy-Related Consumer Harm in Merger Analysis?
A Critical Reassessment of the EU Commission’s Merger Control in Data-Driven Markets,
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3075200 15, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3075200, Nov. 25,
2017.
64 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
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indirect proof.53 And critics have failed even to identify
an input into the retail platform market that Amazon
has denied to competitors, let alone to show that this
denial was product degrading, rather than improving.
The closest they have come is to argue that Amazon
has access to low-cost delivery sources that competing
platforms cannot access. But low-cost delivery clearly
improves Amazon’s platform, so the company’s refusal to
share delivery services with other platforms is hardly bad
conduct.54
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